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The Impact of Indonesian Agricultural
Policies on Indigenous Populations, Natural
Resources and the Economy: The Limits of
Democratic Self-Determination Under
Capitalist Regimes
Scott Brainard*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Understanding the Future of Palm Oil Production
in Latin America Through Its History in Indonesia
The title of this paper highlights a number of interconnected
themes: how Indonesian agricultural policy has affected its indige-
nous populations, its natural environment, and the structure of its
economy; the relationship between these effects; and, more gener-
ally, the structure of capitalist markets and democratic institu-
tions. This set of topics is complex; it is useful, therefore, to
analyze them not with an elaborate theoretical paradigm, but
through a concrete example. Specifically, this paper will examine
how palm oil production has evolved in Indonesia over the last
fifty years. Palm oil is an edible and versatile plant oil produced
from the pulp of the fruit of oil palm trees. It is a common ingredi-
ent in many detergents, processed foods and, increasingly,
biodiesel fuels.' Historically, palm oil production in Indonesia has
involved massive deforestation and air pollution, the expropria-
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spent time as an intern on small-scale diversified organic farms in western New York
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Environmental Education. Scott is now pursuing an MSc in Organic Agriculture at
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1. CONSUMER AND FOOD ECON. INST., U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC., , COMPOSITION OF
FOODS: FATS AND OILs; RAW, PROCESSED, PREPARED, AGRICULTURE HANDBOOK 8-4, 4
(1979); John F. McCarthy & R.A. Cramb, Policy Narratives, Landholder Engagement,
and Oil Palm Expansion on the Malaysian and Indonesian Frontiers, 175 THE
GEOGRAPHIC J. 112, 113 (2009).
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tion of indigenous peoples' lands, and the increasing privatization
of one the fastest growing sub-sectors of the Indonesian economy.2
However, that palm oil production has had these effects is by no
means the consequence of the laws of nature. Instead of leading
to "land alienation, loss of livelihoods, social conflicts, exploitative
labour relations and degraded ecosystems," to quote a recent
report by a coalition of Indonesian human rights and environmen-
tal organizations, palm oil could have functioned as a sustainable
source of "wealth and employment for local communities."'
The opportunity to change course in this way is not lost;
demand for edible oils is currently rising rapidly, especially in
developing nations. Future global demand for edible oil alone is
predicted to double by 20504 as consumption of biofuels rises
worldwide.' Simultaneously, levels of capital investment, increas-
ingly foreign, are on pace to continue to drive the expansion of
land being used for oil palm cultivation at the same rate that
drove the amount of cultivated land from 120,000 hectares' in
1968 to more than six million hectares in 2005.1
These trends are not only of enormous significance for Indone-
sia, but the global South as whole, and Latin America in particu-
lar. As noted in a Declaration released by the Latin American
Network against Monoculture Tree Plantations (hereinafter
"RECOMA") on August 1st, 2009, the first decade of the 21st cen-
tury has seen a dramatic expansion of monoculture tree planta-
tions in the represented countries of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nica-
2. E.g., MARCUS COLCHESTER ET AL., PROMISED LAND: PALM OIL AND LAND
AcQUISITION IN INDONESIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES 11 (2006).
3. Id.
4. R. H. V. Corley, How much palm oil do we need?, 12 ENvTL. Sci. & PoL' 134,
134 (2009).
5. See Wim C. Turkenburg et al. Renewable Energy Technologies, in WORLD
ENERGY ASSESSMENT, ENERGY AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABILITY 219, 223 (Jose
Goldemberg ed., 2000), available at http://www.undp.org/energy/activities/wealdrafts-
frame.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) ("A number of studies have assessed the
potential contribution of biomass to the world energy supply. . . . Although the
percentage contribution of biomass varies considerably, especially depending on
expected land availability and future energy demand, the absolute potential
contribution of biomass in the long term is high-from 100-300 exajoules a year.
World-wide annual primary energy consumption is now about 400 exajoules.").
6. 1 hectare 2.47 acres and 1 square mile 259 hectares. By applying these ratios
in this instance, for example, the increase in the area of land under oil palm
cultivation can be described as rising from -463 sq. miles in 1968 to -19,305 sq. mi. in
2005.
7. COLCHESTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 21.
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ragua, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.' This expansion has led to
the violent appropriation of indigenous lands and political dis-
empowerment of local communities by way of methods that bear
striking similarity to tactics used in Indonesia over the last sev-
eral decades.
For example, since 2004, Mexico has adopted aggressive poli-
cies supporting the development of oil palm plantations. In 2009,
the governor of the state of Chiapas announced plans to bring
100,000 hectares under palm oil cultivation by 2012.' The manner
by which this expansion was to take place was evidenced in Janu-
ary of 2010 when, after the Chiapas State Congress approved the
construction of an palm oil processing plant in the Municipality of
Ocosingo, paramilitary units arrived, "and with aggressive vio-
lence evicted men, women and children from their homes, which
they then burnt down and with no explanation, removed the com-
munity to the city of Palenque."o
As organizations like RECOMA attempt to build resistance to
this form of expansion by developing alternative models for oil
palm production, it is useful to first consider what forces have his-
torically contributed to these devastating methods of expansion in
the palm oil industry. Indonesian history supplies an ample
record of these forces beginning with the rise of General Suharto's
New Order government in 1965. An analysis of the palm oil sub-
sector of Indonesia's agricultural market will proceed in this con-
text as a method for understanding, and supporting attempts at
opposing, the expansion of palm oil production in Latin America
today.
The programs implemented from 1965-1998 by General
Suharto, the second President of Indonesia, to revitalize palm oil
production as a profitable sector of the economy illustrate how the
motives of the wealthiest sectors of society will, if sufficiently
empowered, override all other competing interests including: con-
cerns for the ecological welfare of Indonesia's natural environ-
ment; the economic wellbeing of the landless poor; and the basic
sanctity of the millions of indigenous peoples living in the Outer
8. Declaration by the Latin American Network Against Monoculture Tree
Plantations, WORLD RAINFOREST MOVEMENT (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.wrm.org.uy/
plantations/RECOMA/Declaration.html.
9. Mexico: Oil Palm Business at the Expense of the Poor, WORLD RAINFOREST
MOVEMENT (July 2009) http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/144/Mexico.html.
10. Mexico: Violent Evictions in Chiapas for Establishing Oil Palm Monocultures,
WORLD RAINFOREST MOVEMENT (Feb. 2010), http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/151/
Mexico.html.
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Islands" of the archipelago. Of course, the tendency for a certain
narrow set of powerful economic interests to seek exclusive control
over the means of production is not a unique aspect of the palm oil
sub-sector, but rather a general trend throughout the agricultural
sector. Thus, characterizing the ways market tendencies have
manifested themselves in terms of their historical effects on palm
oil production will shed some light on the nature of the more gen-
eral relations indicated in the title.
B. The New Order Regime's Rise to Power
Before proceeding with an analysis of the policies established
under the New Order regime that dramatically accelerated palm
oil production, however, it is useful to consider some of the history
of General Suharto's "New Order." The rise of the New Order
regime was facilitated by a CIA-backed military coupl2 that, from
1965-1967, eroded the power of then-President Sukarno," purged
Indonesian society of the civilian left," and eventually led to the
formal removal of Sukarno from power on March 12, 1967.1 This
coup was motivated primarily by the burgeoning political viability
of Indonesia's Communist Party, the Partai Komunis Indonesia
(hereinafter "PKI"). 6 Hence, the 1965-1967 coup not only brought
to power an authoritarian leader, General Suharto, but also
destroyed the PKI- the only mass, grassroots political organiza-
tion present in Indonesia at that time. 7
11. The term "Outer Islands" typically refers to all the islands in the Indonesian
archipelago other than Java, Madura and Bali, though in some cases Bali is implied
as well.
12. For an excellent investigation of the United States' involvement in the
overthrow of Indonesia's President Sukarno, see Peter Dale Scott, The United States
and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967, 58 PAC. AFF. 239-40 (1985) (explaining
that in 1957-58, the CIA provided arms and personnel to support regional rebellions
against Sukarno); see also JOSEPH B. SMITH, PORTRAIT OF A COLD WARRIOR: SECOND
THOUGHTS OF A Top CIA AGENT 205 (1976).
13. Sukarno was one of the leaders of Indonesia's struggle for independence
against Dutch colonial rule and Indonesia's first president, from 1965-67. Scott, supra
note 12, at 239.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 239-40.
16. Id. at 254.
17. Id. at 247 ("By 1958, however, the PKI had emerged as the largest mass
movement in the country."). The possibility of a communist movement taking control
of Indonesia's government provoked U.S. strategic planners to train, arm and
coordinate anti-PKI military forces that not only overthrew Sukarno, but also carried
out a massacre of the PKI that was described later in a CIA report as "one of the worst
mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi
mass murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist blood bath of the early
2011] CAPITALIST EFFECTS 169
II. THE OIL PALM SUB-SECTOR UNDER SUHARTO
A. Transmigration
This history provides an important context for analyzing the
ethnocide the New Order regime committed against the indige-
nous peoples inhabiting Indonesia's Outer Islands in the course of
expanding oil palm plantations. This process began to accelerate
rapidly in the late 1970s under the auspices of Transmigration-a
state program that, like the coup against Sukarno, "enjoyed the
unstinting financial support of the western powers,"1" receiving
"massive financial backing from international agencies and west-
ern governments."19 The Dutch first implemented transmigration
schemes at the end of the nineteenth century as a method to pro-
vide a labor force, imported from urban slums on Java and Bali, to
work on rubber and oil palm plantations on Sumatra and other
Outer Islands.2 0 The New Order regime gave similar justifications
for the rapid expansion of the program beginning in the 1970s,
publicly arguing that Transmigration would raise the standard of
living of the urban poor and alleviate the pressures of population
growth in the central islands.21 Privately, however, government
officials overseeing the program admitted that any such hopes
were entirely unrealistic.22
1950s." AUDREY R. KAHIN & GEORGE KAHIN, SUBVERSION AS FOREIGN POLICY: THE
SECRET EISENHOWER AND DULLES DEBACLE IN INDONESIA 227-28 (1997). While exact
casualty figures are not known, "the head of the Indonesian State security agency,
Admiral Sudomo, gave a definitive estimate: he said that more than half a million
people were killed following the attempted coup. There can be no doubt about the
authority of that estimate, except that the true figure is possibly much higher."
AMNESTY INT'L, INDONESIA: AN AMNESTY INT'L REPORT 22, 41 (1977).
18. Carmel Budiardjo, The Politics of Transmigration, 16 THE ECOLOGIST 111, 112
(1986).
19. Marcus Colchester, Banking on Disaster: International Support for
Transmigration, 16 THE ECoLoGIsT61, 61-62 (1986) [hereinafter Banking on Disaster]
("by June 1985, western governments had collectively poured nearly $800 million into
the program. A further $750 million is 'in the pipeline.'").
20. Mariel Otten, 'Transmigrasi': From Poverty to Base Subsistence, 16 THE
ECOLOGIST 71, 71 (1986).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Colchester, supra note 19, at 62 (reporting that at an aide at a 1985
conference between the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) and the
Ministry of Transmigration remarked, "Demographically, the transmigration of
people from Java does not mean very much, because the rate of growth on this island
is big. . . . It is evident that demographically the target of transmigration is not
important. The documentation which has been distributed . . . shows that for 150
years the relocation of people from Java has no effective meaning."); Proceedings of
the Meeting between the Department of Transmigration and the Intergovernmental
Group on Indonesia (IGGI), JAKARTA POST (Mar. 20, 1985).
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Indeed, because the government exerted little effort in train-
ing and supporting settlers,23 it quickly became clear that Trans-
migration was instead being used as a method for developing
large plantation sites and making them available for exploitation
by state-run companies and later, privately-owned corporations. 4
As J.P. Perez-Sainz, a researcher for the Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO), observed in 1978:
What remains clear is that whatever will be the new course
to be followed by Transmigration, the outcome will be the
total proletarianisation of the transmigrants. In this sense,
Transmigration is clearly being structured as a State inter-
vention in favor of and support of capital, mobilizing rela-
tive surplus-labour from Java, implying the further
exploitation of migrants. Therefore Transmigration is
23. See, e.g., Mayling Oey, The Transmigration Program in Indonesia, in
POPULATION RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 27, 42 (Gavin W. Jones &
Hazel V. Richter eds., Austrl. Nat'l Univ., 1982) (noting that the small plots of land
granted to settlers were often not cleared prior to their arrival, and because
transmigrants did not possess the money, time, or machinery to finish clearing the
land, these plots would frequently remain unsuited for agricultural production for
years); see also Otten, supra note 20, at 76 n.11. ("Harun Zain, formerly Minister for
Transmigration, did not mince his words on this point. In an interview with NRC
Handelsblad (9, June 1982), he said that transmigrants were sent into the jungle and
if they produced a surplus, they could not market it."); see also Sediono M.P.
Tjondronegoro, Transmigration Problems Affecting Population Mobility in South
Sumatra, in POPULATION RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 53, 54 (Gavin
W. Jones & Hazel V. Richter eds., Austl. Nat'l Univ., 1982) (reporting that the
infrastructure that was directly necessary for agricultural production itself was often
absent, as was the case at the Way Seputih site in Southern Sumatra where
transmigrants waited fourteen years before any irrigation or drainage canals were
built); see also Catherine Caufleld, Indonesia's Great Exodus, NEW SCIENTIST, May 17,
1984, at 25, 26 (describing the detrimental effects of the industrial machinery
employed when clearing the land, she writes, "Although machetes and chain saws do
less damage to the soil than heavy equipment does, the rush to meet the target of half
a million families in five years means that most land is cleared by big machines.
Generally the trees are knocked down by bulldozers and then burnt-often even
before the commercially valuable species have been taken out. Heavy clearing
equipment compacts the soil so that it loses much of its capacity for retaining water.
Hard rains can then erode the land, silt up nearby rivers and dams, and lead to flash
flooding as the waters 'sheet' along the surface to the ground. The wheels of the
clearing machines scrape off much of the topsoil, exposing subsoils that are less
capable of receiving and storing nutrients, so that fertilisers become less effective.").
24. See Otten, supra note 20, at 75 ("In 1984, in a major policy shift, Martono
announced that the government intended to concentrate on setting up cash-crop
'estates' rather than on giving out land to settlers for subsistence agriculture. Those
settlers who are still able to grow their own food (and, in many areas, the soil is now
so impoverished that growing rice is impossible) will have to fend for themselves,
regardless of whether they have good harvests or bad. The Transmigration
programme will now direct its energies towards investing in sites for exploitation by
state-run or privately-owned plantation companies.").
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changing its focus from an ineffective 'welfare' policy to a
generalized exploitation of migrants.25
Perez-Sainz concludes that the consequences of Transmigra-
tion, a state policy ostensibly engineered to improve Indonesia's
national economic development, in fact exacerbated existing eco-
nomic and social inequities.2 6 This conclusion can be confirmed
independently by examining the manner in which Indonesian
laws were implemented to systemically expropriate indigenous
lands for palm oil production.27 It is crucial to emphasize from the
outset, however, that xenophobia' alone was not the sole motiva-
tion behind such attacks on indigenous communities; the attacks
were a reflection of Transmigration's function as a capitalist
instrument for extending and centralizing private control over the
means of production.
B. The Legal Status of Indonesia's Indigenous
Communities
The original Indonesian Constitution of 1945-a legacy of
Indonesia's own colonization by the Dutch-contains language
that on the one hand demands respect for the legitimacy of the
customary rights of indigenous communities2 9 while, on the other
hand, confers power upon the state to manage and regulate the
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., ULRICH LOFFLER, LAND TENURE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA,
DEUTSCHE GESSELLSCHAFT FUR TECHNICAL ZUSAMMENARBEIT [GERMAN SOCIETY FOR
TECHNICAL COOPERATION], 35 (1996) ("The Presidential Decree No. 1 / 1976
concerning the Implementation of Agrarian Affairs .. .Where a piece of land (intended
as a part of an HPH [in Bahasa: Hak Pengusahaan Hutan] [Forest Use Right]) is
controlled by the local adat community under a valid right [hak yang sah] that land
must be cleared (of those rights) at the outset with the payment of compensation . . .
and where the holder of an HPH needs to close off an area with the result that the
local community cannot enjoy its adat rights, the HPH holder must give compensation
to the community."), available at http://www.mekonginfo.org/mrc-en/doclib.nsfl0/
2EC60BFD3F9C90CB802566DA003DCB40/$FILE/FULLTEXT.HTML.
28. See, e.g., Marcus Colchester, Unity and Diversity, Indonesian Policy Towards
Tribal Peoples, 16 THE ECOLOGIST 89, 89 (1986) [hereinafter Unity and Diversity]
(reporting that at the 1985 conference between the Intergovernmental Group on
Indonesia (IGGI) and the Ministry of Transmigration, Martono, the Minister of
Transmigration, declared, "we have one native country, Indonesia; one language, the
Indonesian language. By way of Transmigration, we will try to realize what has been
pledged, to integrate all the ethnic groups into one nation, the Indonesia nation. . . .");
Proceedings of the Meeting between the Department of Transmigration and the
Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), JAKARTA POST (Mar. 20, 1985).
29. See, e.g., Undang-Undang Dasar [UUD] [Constitution] Aug. 18, 2000, §XA, art.
281, 13 (Indon.) ("The cultural identities and rights of traditional communities are to
be respected in conjunction with progressing times and civilization.").
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use of national resources as it sees fit.30 The obvious tension
between these two sources of authority-indigenous people's
traditional laws and the Indonesian State-was resolved unequiv-
ocally in subsequent legislation which provided the State with
expansive discretionary powers when determining whether, in
any particular instance, indigenous rights could legitimately be
subordinated for the benefit of Indonesia's "national interests.""
In the process of clarifying the potentially ambiguous rela-
tionship between indigenous communities' sovereignty and the
sovereignty of the State, the Basic Agrarian Law ("BAL") provided
the legal framework for the State to act as the sole adjudicator in
determining ownership of agricultural resources." Decisions
regarding whether indigenous peoples even existed were consid-
ered to be an evaluation that only the State could, in any given
instance, legitimately carry out.33
In this way, the state strategically acknowledged portions of
indigenous communities' traditional laws while reserving to itself
the power to legitimately violate them. The Indonesian Depart-
ment of Social Affairs summarized Article 3 of the BAL:
. . said isolated communities of autochthonous 34 people
have a legal title over the land, that is needed for their liv-
ing. Such a right of ownership over land, that prevails in
said communities, is recognized and legalized by the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Indonesia, but its implementa-
30. See, e.g., id. at § XJV, art. 33, 2-3 ("Production sectors that are vital to the
state and that affect the livelihood of a considerable part of the population are to be
controlled by the state. The land and the waters as well as the natural riches therein
are to be controlled by the state to be exploited to the greatest benefit of the people.").
31. For example, with regard to the rights to natural resources conferred by
indigenous peoples' customary laws, Article 3 of the Basic Agrarian Law (hereinafter
"BAL") states: "In view of the provisions contained in Articles 1 and 2, the
implementation of the ulayat [collective] rights and other similar rights of adat-law
[customary] communities-as long as such communities in reality still exist-must be
such that it is consistent with the national interest and the State's interest and shall
not contradict the laws and regulations of higher levels." BAL, 1960, Art. 3 (Indon.),
available at www.eastimorlawjournal.org/LEGALRESEARCH/UUPAEnglish.DOC
(last visited Oct. 6, 2011.). Article 5 elaborates on this notion, stipulating that: The
agrarian law applicable to the earth, water, and airspace is adat provided that it is
not contrary to the national interest and the interest of the State, which are based on
national unity, to Indonesian socialism, to the provisions stipulated in this Act, nor to
other legislation. [Id. at Art. 5.]
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. Autochthonous Definition, MERRIAM*WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/autochthonous (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) ("1) Indigenous,
Native; 2) formed or originating in the place where found.").
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tion should take place in such a way as is in accordance
with national and State interests."
As detailed in "General Explanation No. 4(a) of Law No. 20 of
1961," the BAL therefore implicitly legitimized the expropriation
of lands in order to support private economic interests:
In general, according to Article 18 of the BAL, the revo-
cation of rights may be executed for state businesses (cen-
tral and local government) in order to serve public interest.
However, this law opens the possibilities to revoke the
rights for private purposes, based on agreement with the
owner. The private sector plan should certainly have been
agreed by the government and be in accordance with the
national development plan.36
An analogous notion was expressed in a clause that was added to
the Basic Forestry Law of 1967 that explicitly sanctioned the
seizure of indigenous lands and resources in order to support
Transmigration.
It is unsurprising, therefore, that when oil palm companies
were granted forest concessions that included indigenous lands,
the state typically required the companies to pay compensation
only for those lands whose ownership could be confirmed with an
ownership title.38 As Weinstock and Vergara explained in a 1987
study of land tenure practices in indigenous communities, Indone-
sian agrarian laws:
are based upon [the] western notion of absolute ownership.
To be officially recognized, land must be demarcated, pref-
erably by survey, and titled in the name of a single individ-
ual. Use rights to a loosely demarcated parcel of land that
are held by a number of related individuals are not
35. Marcus Colchester, The Struggle for Land: Tribal Peoples in the Face of the
Transmigration Programme, 16 THE ECOLOGIST 99, 105 (1986) [hereinafter Struggle
for Land].
36. Revoking of Rights on Land and Assets Thereon, Law No. 20, Gen.
Explanation No. 4(a) (1961), S.G. Gazette No. 283 (Indon.), translated in MARCUS
COLCHESTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 53 (2006).
37. Basic Forestry Act, Clarification Act No. 2823, Clause 17 (1967), S.G. No. 8
(Indon.), translated in THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND, supra note 35 at 105 ("The rights of
traditional-law communities may not be allowed to stand in the way of the
establishment of Transmigration settlements.").
38. Martua Sirait, Conversion of Public Land and Tenure Security in Lampong,
Indonesia 11 n.7 (Land, Poverty, Social Justice & Development International
Conference, Jan. 9, 2006), available at www.iss.nl/content/download/3616/35277/file/
Sirait.pdf
1732011]
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recognized."
In 1970, this principle was extended further in a governmental
regulation that justified violating indigenous claims to their land
and resources in order to maximize agricultural yields:
The rights of customary law communities and their mem-
bers to harvest forest products based on customary law
may be exercised, so long as those rights still exist, but they
should be regulated so the exercise of these rights does not
hamper the exploitation of forest concessions.40
As in the BAL of 1960, policies such as these, while appearing to
formally codify the legitimacy of indigenous communities' tradi-
tional rights and laws within certain limits, constituted a very
clear assault on customary laws regulating ownership and use of
all natural resources. This is because, as Weinstock and Vergara
note:
Ownership of economically valuable plants, in the eyes of
the government, must be made through ownership of the
land on which they are growing. Somewhat tautologically,
agrarian laws state that rights to land can only be secured
if it is proved that the land has a hasil or "yield." To claim
the plants, an individual must claim the land, but to claim
the land, it must have plants on it."
Most indigenous communities, however, practice a form of exten-
sive agriculture that also functions as a method for conserving for-
est resources. As a result, vast tracts of land may lay fallow at any
given time.42 Because indigenous communities were consequently
stripped of any legitimate claim to these lands while they lay fal-
low, significant portions of their territory were made vulnerable to
expropriation. Furthermore, concepts of individual ownership
over clearly delimited quantities of natural resources are often
absent in indigenous societies. For example, as geographers
Brookfield and Hart write of the indigenous communities through-
out Melanesia:
The foundation of any group's identity is ultimately in the
land which the group "owns" and uses. Whether exercised
39. J.A. Weinstock & N.T. Vergara, Land or Plants: Agricultural Tenure in
Agroforestry Systems, 41 ECON. BOTANY 312, 319 (1987).
40. Rights of Forest Concession and Forest Product Harvesting, (1970), S.G. 1970/
31, Art. 16, 1(Indon.), translated in COLCHESTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 50.
41. Weinstock, supra note 39, at 318.
42. See Michael R. Dove, The Agroecological Mythology of the Javanese and the
Political Economy of Indonesia 39 INDoNESIA 1, 9 (1985).
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or not, rights in land are the basis of personal status and
security ... An individual's rights mesh ... into those of the
group to which he belongs. Behind and around the individ-
ual title is a continuing group title, to used and unused
land alike, and individual rights are validated by their
membership of a group."
Because of this aspect of the relationship between indigenous soci-
eties and their lands, ownership rights over any specific tract of
land cannot be legitimately granted or in any other way alienated
from the groups that inhabit the land-even in the name of the
members of communities themselves. Rather, ownership is trans-
ferred exclusively and in perpetuity through a process of collective
inheritance within each community, and as among the Mae Enga
of Papua New Guinea, "genealogies serve as charters that validate
the rights of descent groups to patrimonial land."" As Colchester
summarizes, "to say that land belongs to or is owned by the group
is somewhat misleading. It is much closer to the truth to say that
the individuals of the group hold their land in trust."" The Indo-
nesian legislation discussed above-by recognizing the traditional
rights of indigenous communities to their lands, but only insofar
as the lands are actively being put to use for intensive agricultural
production 4 6 and where ownership is certified and confirmed with
surveys and titles held by individuals"-therefore had the practi-
cal consequence of negating the principles by which land is owned
and maintained by indigenous peoples. Instead of securing indig-
enous communities' claims of land ownership, these laws under-
mined them while codifying the logic of capitalist systems.
Because economic development demands an unyielding expansion
of private ownership over natural resources, Indonesian law pro-
vided an efficient justification for a policy of giving unwavering
state support to industrial monoculture.
This is why, when increasing palm oil production was deter-
mined by the State to be a crucial element of Indonesia's "national
economic development plan," indigenous communities were forced
to cede large pieces of "unused" lands to palm oil companies in
order to allow for the expansion of oil palm plantations. That
43. H. C. BROOKFIELD & DOREEN HART, MELANESIA: A GEOGRAPHICAL
INTERPRETATION OF AN ISLAND WORLD 227, 419 (1971).
44. MERVYN MEGGITI, BLOOD IS THEIR ARGUMENT 5-7 (1977).
45. Struggle for Land, supra note 35, at 101.
46. Weinstock, supra note 39, at 318.
47. Michael R. Dove, The Agroecological Mythology of the Javanese and the
Political Economy of Indonesia, 39 INDoNEsIA 1, 9 (1985).
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forced cession occurred despite the fact that indigenous notions of
collective rights precluded a priori the possibility of a legitimate
transfer of land ownership to a private company." Thus, as stipu-
lated in Presidential Decree No. 1 of 1976 "Regarding the Imple-
mentation of Agrarian Affairs with the Forestry, Mining,
Transmigration and Public Works Sectors":
Where a piece of land (intended as a part of an HPH is con-
trolled by the local adat community under a valid right
[hak yang sah] that land must be cleared [of those rights] at
the outset with the payment of compensation, . . . [and]
where the holder of an HPH needs to close off an area with
the result that the local community cannot enjoy its adat
rights, the HPH holder must give compensation to the
community."
At the 1985 meeting between the IGGI and the Ministry of Trans-
migration, the method by which communities should be compen-
sated was described in terms of the Alokasi Pemukiman
Penduduk Daerah Transmigrasi (hereinafter " APPDT") (Resettle-
ment Allocation for Inhabitants of Transmigration Regions) pro-
gram."o According to this model, in addition to paying the
development costs of a central "nucleus" estate, private companies
would finance the conversion of the satellite areas into oil palm
plantations. This was supplied by way of loans that the indige-
nous community would be required to begin repaying after the
seventh growing season 1 (prior to which oil palm plantations are
either non-productive altogether and/or unprofitable). Further-
48. See, COLCHESTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 168-69.
49. LOFFLER, supra note 27, at §3.6.
50. Struggle for Land, supra note 35, at 105 n.49.
51. COLCHESTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 75; "In 1985, the bupati (district head)
issued a decree regarding the land allocation for PT KCMU's nucleus estate
smallholder plantation, requiring that fully 40% of acquired lands should be allocated
to the company for its nucleus estates (inti) while only 60% should be allocated to the
community members registering on the scheme, as smallholdings (plasma). The
decree also elaborated in some detail on the installments for the payment of credit to
the farmers. The company was to loan IDR 7.4 million per hectare of land to the
community. In the 7th year of the plantation cycle, project participants should start to
pay off the loan in installments in the form of 30% of the takings from harvested
produce. Payments should then be made every three months to the company-
established smalholder cooperative. Moreover the company would only hand over
titles to the plasma land to those project participants who had paid off all their loan.
In effect therefore, the community members were losing 40% of their land to the
company and only recovering their ownership rights to the remaining 60% if they
could pay off their debts. According to interviewees, in practice the harvests have
never been good, debts remain unpaid and in any case the company has been more
interested in buying full rights to the land for use as inti than in maintaining
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more, the owner of the nucleus would act as the exclusive buyer of
oil palm fruits grown on satellite estates.5 2
This model severely subordinated those cultivating satellite
areas to the operator of the nucleus estate: Not only did the own-
ers of the nucleus estate manipulate the price at which they pur-
chased satellite growers' oil palm, they also frequently under-
invested in satellite areas. This consequently made it likely that
satellite growers would eventually have to abandon their lands
due to poor harvests, often by selling them to the nucleus estate at
a loss. Indeed, the ultimate consequence of the escalation of the
Transmigration program in the 1980s was the creation of large
nucleus estates maintained by a transmigrant labor force. This
labor force was made up of settlers who, having failed to gain own-
ership over their satellite areas and reneged on their loans,
became wage-laborers for corporate plantation operators. 3 It is
therefore unsurprising that indigenous groups often cited con-
cerns regarding price manipulation and underinvestment as ratio-
nales for their opposition to such arrangements.54
plasma." see, e.g., Sirait, supra note 38 at 14 n.20 (citing Minutes of Meeting of
Musyawarah (June 10, 1995)).
52. John McCarthy & Zahari Zen, Regulating the Oil Palm Boom: Assessing the
Effectiveness of Environmental Governance Approaches to Agro-industrial Pollution in
Indonesia, 32 LAw & POL'Y 153, 156 (2010) ("The institutional arrangements of the
various KEPA schemes specify the conditions under which the satellite smallholders
obtain agricultural inputs and sell their output (FFB) to the oil palm mill owned by
the estate, and how they repay their credit to the farmer cooperative. However, these
arrangements subjected smallholders to a monopsony situation, whereby they were
contractually obliged to sell FFB to the one buyer (the estate) who was able (locally) to
manipulate prices."); see also Sirait, supra note 38 at 14.
53. See Caufield, supra note 23, at 74 ("In 1984, in a major policy shift, Martono
announced that the government intended to concentrate on setting up cash-crop
'estates' rather than on giving out land to settlers for subsistence agriculture. Those
settlers who are still able to grow their own food (and, in many areas, the soil is now
so impoverished that growing rice is impossible) will have to fend for themselves,
regardless of whether they have good harvests or bad. The Transmigration
programme will now direct its energies towards investing in sites for exploitation by
state-run or privately-owned plantation companies.").
54. Colchester et al., supra note 2 at 88 ("An environmental impact assessment
(ANDAL) study for the PT KCMU operation carried out in 1996, reveals that a high
percentage of the people were concerned about the establishment of the oil palm
plantation. Their main fear was that the oil palm plantation would destroy the
people's damar gardens. They were also concerned that the company would determine
prices of oil palm fruits and undermine the communities' businesses in coffee, pepper
and damar. Also, some of the adat community who did not own land were afraid that
they would lose opportunities to get wage labour on local farms because of the
establishment of oil palm plantations. The impact study also described the popular
unrest in the face of the land acquisition and land consolidation processes based on
concerns that this could lead to land scarcity in the future. For these reasons, many
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III. CONTINUITIES BETWEEN THE NEW ORDER AND THE
CURRENT REFORMASI PERIOD
A. Failed Attempts at Empowering Indigenous
Communities
It is undeniable that militaristic sentiments influenced the
manner in which oil palm plantations were expanded during the
New Order.55 General Murdani-Commander-in-Chief of the Indo-
nesian armed forces, and previously the leader of the 1975 inva-
sion of East Timor-was quoted in 1985 describing
Transmigration as:
the only programme in the economic field that must quite
categorically be tied in with defence and security considera-
tions. The preparation of sites and the removal of obstacles
to land availability need to be given special focus, because
the choice of sites is related to the ABRI [Armed Forces of
the Republic of Indonesia] concept of territorial manage-
ment. This is why the armed forces must be involved at the
earliest possible stage in selecting the sites.56
The foregoing illustrates that an atmosphere of xenophobia5 1 was
not the only, and indeed not the primary condition that made the
acceleration of palm oil production possible. More fundamentally,
the oil palm sub-sector received crucial financial support from for-
adat communities wanted to firmly reject the establishment of the plantation. The
report wisely recommended that the company should provide the communities with
clear information on: the goals of the project; their plans to enclave the lands of any
community members that chose not to be involved in the project; and how they would
pay appropriate prices for harvested products from the plasma plantation."); see, e.g.,
Sirait, supra note 38, at 17 n.33 (citing PT KCMU, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT (ANDAL) PIR OIL PALM PLANTATION AND OIL PALM PROCESSING FACTORY
KCMU COMPANY, SuB-DSTRICT OF SOUTH SEASHORE).
55. Struggle for Land, supra note 35.
56. PETER KING, WEST PAPUA AND INDONESIA SINCE SUHARTO: INDEPENDENCE,
AUTONOMr OR CHAOs? 114 (University of New South Wales Press, 2004) (quoting
Sinar Harapan (Mar. 8, 1985)).
57. See, e.g., Unity and Diversity, supra note 28, at 89 (reporting that at the 1985
conference between the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) and the
Ministry of Transmigration, Martono, the Minister of Transmigration, declared, "we
have one native country, Indonesia; one language, the Indonesian language. By way
of Transmigration, we will try to realize what has been pledged, to integrate all the
ethnic groups into one nation, the Indonesia nation." (quoting Proceedings of the
Meeting between the Department of Transmigration and the Intergovernmental
Group on Indonesia (IGGI), Jakarta (Mar. 20, 1985))). Clearly, Transmigration's
function as a method for realizing the imperial aims of economic and territorial
expansion was frequently downplayed in certain contexts; instead, its justification
was seen as founded upon its specifically cultural and social power as a unifying force
capable of assimilating numerous disparate foreign populations.
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eign governments and international banking institutions, a set of
economic programs-like Transmigration-designed to create a
displaced and disempowered labor force, and a legal framework
justifying the expansion of increasingly private modes of produc-
tion."8 Only by first recognizing the numerous and complex forces
which supported the initial surge in palm oil production in the
1970s and 1980s can the effects of political decentralization since
the fall of Suharto's New Order regime in 1998 be effectively
analyzed.
Following the collapse of Suharto's New Order regime, a num-
ber of pieces of legislation were passed that did affirm and recog-
nize the legitimacy of indigenous communities' customary political
and cultural institutions, and apparently fulfilled these communi-
ties' demand that the State guarantee and protect their autono-
mous status." In the years since their passage, however, these
laws have proven to be generally ineffective as mechanisms for
empowering indigenous communities and democratizing regional
governmental institutions. For example, one piece of legislation
that is commonly cited as helping to usher in what is commonly
referred to as the "Reformasi Period"60 in Indonesia politics by
58. See Caufield, supra note 23, at 74 ("In 1984, in a major policy shift, Martono
announced that the government intended to concentrate on setting up cash-crop
'estates' rather than on giving out land to settlers for subsistence agriculture. Those
settlers who are still able to grow their own food (and, in many areas, the soil is now
so impoverished that growing rice is impossible) will have to fend for themselves,
regardless of whether they have good harvests or bad. The Transmigration
programme will now direct its energies towards investing in sites for exploitation by
state-run or privately-owned plantation companies.")
59. ANNE CASSON, CTR FOR INT'L FORESTRY RESEARCH, THE HESITANT BOOM:
INDONESIA'S OIL PALM SUB-SECTOR IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL
CHANGE 18 (1999). ("In East Kalimantan, LonSum was accused of clearing land and
planting oil palm before obtaining the necessary permits. In response,
'Representatives from 9 villagers went to LonSum's estate office in East Kalimantan
to present their demands for compensation. They requested Rp 250 billion
(approximately $US 25 million) for land, crops and damage to burial sites.' In
addition, 'Villages seized heavy equipment, including bulldozers and trucks and set
fire to part of the base camp. Two office buildings, a fertilizer store and some workers
accommodations were destroyed in this incident.' In Aceh, Socfindo expanded their
plantation estate without paying adequate compensation. In January, 1998, 'Socfindo
claim[ed] that two of their staff were tortured and three seriously beaten' and
'accused the local community of destroying oil palm plantations, and staff houses.' In
Riau, after the customary land of a number of communities was allocated to a
plantation company, PT Torganda, without their consent, 'hundreds of villagers from
Ujung Gading Jae village clashed with PT Torganda. The clash resulted in two
villagers being wounded and a bulldozer being burnt. The incident occurred after
farmers ambushed PT Torganda workers who were clearing land to make way for oil
palm plantations in Bukit Harapan, Ujung Gading.").
60. The Reformasi period refers to the years since the collapse of the New Order
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allowing indigenous communities to play a more direct role in how
their lands are incorporated into massive oil palm plantations is
Law No. 22 of 1999.61 In this regard, Law No. 22/1999 is under-
stood as an attempt to overturn the rigid hierarchical distribution
of political power established by the Village Administration Act of
1979. As Marcus Colchester explains:
One of the important impacts of the Village Administration
Act was that it subordinated all villages to a single common
bureaucratic structure that was imposed throughout Indo-
nesia. Villages were often regrouped and were all renamed
by the Javanese term desa. Each desa was run by a village
head (kepala desa) who was placed under the control of the
head (camat) of the sub-district (kecamatan).62
Law No. 22/1999 explicitly noted the unconstitutionality of the
Village Administration Act63 and affirmed the principle that the
customary rights of self-governing indigenous communities ought
to be formally respected by Indonesian law.' Despite such prom-
ising endorsements of civil society's demands for increased popu-
lar control of state functions, however, in the years since its
passage Law No. 22/1999 has been implemented primarily for the
regime in 1998, during which attempts have been made at passing legislation to
democratize political processes. See, e.g., Kurt Biddle, Indonesia: Reformasi Betrayed,
SOLIDARITY-US.ORG (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
61. Regarding Regional Governance [RRGI, Law No. 22, (1999), S.G. No. 60
(Indon.) translated in SUNARYATI HARTONO ET AL., POLITICAL CHANGE AND LEGAL
REFORM TOWARDS DEMOCRACY AND SUPREMACY OF LAW IN INDONESIA (2002), available
at http://www.ide.gojplEnglish/Publish/Download/Als/pdf/12.pdf.
62. COLCHESTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 47.
63. Indeed, Law No. 22/1999 contains language that was clearly crafted as a
response to the portion of the Village Administration Act. See, e.g., HARTONO ET AL.,
supra note 61, at Art. 1, § o. ("The Village/Desa or a similar unit known under
different names but for short to be called Desa [here], is a legal-communal bond of a
community which has competencies to regulate and administer the interests of its
local community based on its origins [asal-usull and local customs, which is
acknowledged by the National Governmental System and [its territory is] within the
regency.").
64. See, e.g., Id. at 146 (commending Art. 9 for allowing villages, "to choose their
own territorial names according to indigenous local common laws, thus
acknowledging the variety and multiplicity of the village['s] cultural backgrounds, the
community's customary ways of village participation, the indigenous local autonomy
and system[s] of democracy"); see also Id. at 139 (noting that Art. 104 requires that a
guiding principle of Villages' representational institutions must be to act, "to protect
the common laws, to make village regulations, to tap and channel local people's
aspirations, and control the activities of the Village administration"); see also Id.
(noting that Art. 111 "legally obligates everybody to adhere to the indigenous origins
and common laws of the villages.")
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purposes of centralizing state functions. For example, as
Colchester notes discussing the law's lasting impact:
After being implemented for more than five years, Law No.
22 of 1999 was replaced by Law No. 32 of 2004 regarding
Regional Autonomy. The new Law was passed hastily with-
out real debate or prior evaluation of what had been
achieved under the law it replaced. The new law somewhat
restricts the scope for community self-governance and has
been interpreted as an attempt to re-centralize government
authority at the village level by subordinating the author-
ity of village-level representative bodies (Badan Perwaki-
lan Desa) to the village head (Kepala Desa), in turn
clarifying that they are subject to the district regent
(bupati).5
This is consistent with the analysis of Hartono, whose evaluation
of the actual effects of Law No. 22/1999 led to the conclusion that
although, "politically a number of competencies were gladly
handed over to the regencies [sub-divisions within a given prov-
ince] . . . realities demanded a more active role of the provinces
[Indonesia consists of 33 provinces, which are analogous to State
Governments in the U.S.] into the regencies' affairs."66
Such indictments of Law No. 22/1999 can be generally applied
to similar legislation passed at the outset of the Reformasi Period.
For example, in 2001 a survey team assembled by a number of
Indonesian Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGO") published
a report" comparing the social impacts of Law No. 22/1999 and
Law No. 25/1999, the latter being another prominent piece of leg-
islation passed in 1999 which, under the pretense of decentraliz-
ing government functions, attempted to reform the state's
economic decision-making processes.' The assessment of the sur-
vey team not only confirmed the judgments made by Hartono and
65. COLCHESTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 48.
66. HARTONO ET AL., supra note 66, at 143 (highlighting the fact that the control of
"the exploitation of human resources"-a process that is obviously highly relevant to
oil palm production in Indonesia-was "not transferred to the provinces the [sic] less
to the regencies," as an emblematic example of how "the clash of interests between the
Central Government versus the Local Governments," has been resolved in the wake of
Law No. 22/1999); see also id. at 149 (wherein Hartono et al. describe how Art. 7 in
particular represented a strategic attack on "local political decisions based on local
religious realities," since it "made 'religious affairs' the competency for the Central
Government.").
67. HARTONO ET AL., supra note 61, at 148.
68. Law No. 25 of 1999, Regarding the Fiscal Balance Between the Central
Government and the Regions, (1999), (Indon.), available at http:/ipdprojects.org/
logoling-sea/resource/pdflLaw25_99_99_neluc.pdf.
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Colchester regarding Law No. 22/1999,69 but argued that an
equivalent anti-democratic tendency manifested itself in the
implementation of Law No. 25/1999. Instead of creating practi-
cally feasible mechanisms by which economic policy could be
designed more democratically, "Law No. 25/1999 in its further
elaborations, still reflect[s] the struggle of forces to retain the cen-
tralistic approach in economic policies and development in
general."o7
Similarly, while some of the most abusive amendments to the
BAL passed under Suharto have been repealed or modified during
the Reformasi Period, the fundamental hierarchy of interests
established by the BAL continues to be used as the basis for nego-
tiating conflicting rights claims. Thus, palm oil production in
Indonesia has not significantly changed in terms of who is decid-
ing how, and on what basis, plantation development and expan-
sion unfolds. The terms of the land concessions previously
awarded to companies already operating oil palm plantations,
despite enduring opposition by indigenous groups 7 have for the
most part remained unchanged.72 It is true that some policies do
contain stipulations that recognize, to a very limited degree, the
legitimate claims of indigenous peoples to their traditional lands.
For example, Presidential Regulation No. 36 of 2005 on Land Pro-
curement for Development for Public Purposes requires that the
determination of the amount of compensation provided for any
lands taken from indigenous communities be "based upon a con-
sensus between the rights holders and the government." Never-
theless, such procedural recommendations have had very little
69. See, e.g., HARTONO ET AL., supra note 61, at 148 ("[Law No. 25 of 1999] still
reflects a number of political efforts to withdraw competencies already transferred to
the regions ... in order to 'contribute to national development' giving to the villages
no instruments to refuse or veto.").
70. Id. at 149.
71. COLCHESTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 92 ("Surveys conducted by the University
of Lampung in 2002 revealed that most community members (99.4%) favoured the
change of these areas' status from forest zones into non-forest zones (APL). Yet, this
research also highlighted that people were worried about the unclear boundaries
between their lands and the remaining protected forest, as well as the overlap
between redistributed areas and lands claimed to be owned by customary marga.
Most people did not posses land titles, leaving them vulnerable to being appropriated
by more powerful interests, thereby risking further land conflicts.").
72. See, e.g., Christopher R. Duncan, From Development to Empowerment:
Changing Indonesia Government Policies toward Indigenous Minorities, in CIVILIZING
THE MARGINS: SOUTHEAST ASIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
MINORITIEs, 86, 104 (Christopher R. Duncan ed., NUS Press, 2008) (citing Ministry of
Forestry Decree No. 47/1998).
73. COLCHESTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 55.
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practical significance since, as Presidential Regulation No. 36/
2005 adds, ". . . if any dispute arises, the government may unilat-
erally set the compensation and entrust the compensation money
to a district court."74
B. Limitations on the State's Power to Regulate Palm
Oil Production
In order to understand the overall effect of the legislation that
has been passed during the Reformasi Period on how oil palm is
grown in Indonesia, it is important to also consider the dramatic
deregulation of the palm oil sub-sector that has occurred since the
fall of the New Order regime. For example, in 1998 the govern-
ment granted State Forestry Companies permission to use 30% of
their concession for estate crops75 such as oil palm. Anne Casson,
an economist at the Center for International Forestry Research,
observed:
The decision will therefore contribute to, and legitimize,
expansion of estate crops onto permanent production forest
land. Estate crops were previously only supposed to be
established on conversion forest land, which supposedly
have less forest cover than permanent production forest
land."
Indeed, this was seemingly the intended consequence, as this pol-
icy was soon expanded in August of 1999 to give all plantation
companies the right to obtain holdings in production forest (which
previously had only been granted to logging companies), 40% of
which could be devoted to estate crops. As Casson wrote:
This new regulation has the potential to be particularly
damaging to Indonesia's forest cover as it gives plantation
companies the right to plant oil palm, or other tree crops, in
production forest. The regulation also gives logging compa-
nies little incentive to practice sustainable logging tech-
niques or to rehabilitate their concessions. This is because
forest land allocated to logging companies can now be
directly converted to plantation crops after the HPH license
expires. Logging companies are therefore more likely to
clear cut their concessions rather than use selective logging
74. Id.
75. Crops grown on large plantations, often by workers who live on-site. See Estate
Crops, COuNrYSTUDIES.US (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) http://www.countrystudies.us/
indonesia/67.htm
76. CASSON, supra note 59, at 18.
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techniques."
More recently, in February of 2009, Indonesia lifted its ban on the
use of peat land for palm oil production, a ban that had been put
in place because the process of converting a tract of peat land into
an oil palm plantation releases tremendous quantities of green-
houses gases."
Interestingly, there have also been substantial attempts to
decentralize the regulation of oil palm plantations during the
Reformasi Period. For example, in October of 1999, President
Habibie-Suharto's vice president who rose to power immediately
following the New Order regime's overthrow-issued a decree that
gave provincial authorities full control over the approval of foreign
or domestic palm oil investment projects, regardless of the size of
the planned investment." This decentralization was justified as a
method for creating a more democratic regulatory process that
might bring palm oil production under greater popular control and
allow for the enforcement of more stringent environmental stan-
dards than the national government could effectively apply.
Instead, however, it has made it significantly easier for oil palm
companies to pursue environmentally destructive production
practices.o This is because, as Casson noted presciently at the
time:
Provincial Investment Offices will be eager to accept invest-
ment in order to generate much needed revenue and palm
oil investors will be eager to take advantage of simplified
investment procedures. It is possible investments will be
pushed through without much consideration for local com-
77. Id. at 37.
78. Ian MacKinnon, Indonesia Reopens Peatland to Palm Oil Plantation,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (Feb. 18, 2009, 4:16 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2009/feb/18/indonesia-peat-palm-oil.
79. See Investment Licensing Powers to be Delegated to Provinces, THE JAKARTA
POST, July 21, 1999, at 8.
80. These damages themselves have been well-documented. See, e.g., John
McCarthy & Zahari Zen, Regulating the Oil Palm Boom: Assessing the Effectiveness of
Environmental Governance Approaches to Agro-industrial Pollution in Indonesia, 32
LAW & POL'Y 153, 156 (2010) ( "sixty tons of fresh fruit bunches (FFB) per hour...
produce 1,200 cubic meters of effluent per day of liquid waste. This level of liquid
waste produces a biological oxygen demand (BOD) of 25.000 mg/L, a pollution load
(15.000 kg BOD/day) equivalent to the sewerage produced by a city of 75,000 people
... While some State companies employ the shells of oil palm fruits to fill roads
around the plantation, most factories use the shells for internal combustion for
powering their boiling stations, producing an enormous amount of black smoke and
dust.").
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munities or the environment.'
If, in addition to formally decentralizing the regulation of oil palm
plantations, the national government had provided provinces with
the funding necessary to enforce meaningful environmental stan-
dards, Casson's predictions might not have come to pass. But suf-
ficient funds were never allocated, and thus provincial
governments were forced into a position where the rigorous appli-
cation of a strict set of regulations was impossible. Instead, pro-
vincial governments now attempt to attract private investments
for new oil palm plantations with such desperation that, as
described in a recent report conducted by the Indonesia-Nether-
lands Study on Environmental Law and Administration in Indo-
nesia ("INSELA"), "large [oil palm] factories have considerable
political and economic leverage, and bribery and intimidation of
regional officials attempting to enforce environmental regulations
is not unknown."82
This situation-in which local governments have been forced
into opposing the enforcement of environmental regulations with
such resolve that they often actively work against attempts to
democratize regulatory procedures-has had some very unfortu-
nate consequences. An exemplary and vivid illustration of such
consequences came in 2001 when Wahana Lingkungan Hidup
(hereinafter "WAHLI") (Friends of the Earth Indonesia), a grass-
roots NGO based in Jambi, distributed a press release criticizing a
newly proposed 1 million hectare oil palm plantation, "arguing
that it would destroy forests, and wipe out the sustainable liveli-
hoods of communities living near the forests."" Subsequently, the
US-British-Swiss venture capital consortium, Asian Jade Venture
Ltd.-with whom the governor of Jambi had signed a Memoran-
dum of Understanding covering a $500 million investment in the
plantation-put a temporary hold on the plantation's construction
in order to allow for a re-review of its potential environmental
impact. In response, Zulkifli Nurdin, the governor of Jambi, furi-
ously accused WALHI "of being anti-investment, anti-progress
and anti-regional autonomy"84 and launched a campaign to shut
down WALHI's operations in Jambi."
81. CASSON, supra note 59, at 19.
82. McCarthy & Zen, supra note 80, at 159-160.
83. Oil Palm Investments Opposed, DowN To EARTH No. 49 (Down to Earth,
Hallbankgate, Cumbria, U.K.), May 2001, at 3, available at http://dte.gn.apc.org/
490P.htm [hereinafter Oil Palm].
84. Id.
85. The attack on environmentalist NGOs continues right through to the present
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This exemplifies the paradoxical result of decentralizing
authority in Indonesia. Ironically, that decentralization has pro-
duced a political situation that continues to vigorously exclude
popular participation in decision-making by allowing for the emer-
gence of local elites who are "insisting strongly on the transfer of
power from central to regional governments,"86 without then open-
ing these local governing bodies to actual democratic control by
regional populations. As with legislation like Law No. 22/1999-
laws that appeared to constitute a response to demands for the
recognition of the sovereignty of indigenous communities' systems
of customary rights-popular demands for the democratization of
state functions were betrayed, and incorporated into a renewed
effort to further centralize power in the hands of anti-democratic,
state-corporate institutions.
C. The Policy Effects of Indonesia's Need for Foreign
Investment
These striking failures of the policies of the Reformasi Period
bring into focus the complicated factors that explain the forces
that drove the transformation in Indonesian's agricultural laws
during the 1960s and 1970s. Given the degree to which democrat-
ically elected officials have, since 1998, been unwilling to signifi-
cantly modify these laws, the fact that xenophobic sentiments may
have laid behind the state's rigorous defense of its "national eco-
nomic interests and security" in the case of certain individuals
(e.g., Minister Martono and General Murdani's defense of Trans-
migration as a method for expanding oil palm plantations") can-
not fully explain their policies. Rather, even the expansion of
Transmigration in the 1970s and 1980s was fundamentally a
method of absorbing the means of agricultural production into a
capitalist regime, despite the fact that it was only later that state-
on the eastern coast on Sumatra. See, e.g., Budi Otmansyah, Greenpeace Protest
Camp Destroyed in Suspicious Fire, THE JAKARTA GLOBE, Apr. 12, 2010, http://www.
thejakartaglobe.com/home/greenpeace-protest-camp-destroyed-in-suspicious-fire/368
919 (reporting that on April 11, 2010 in the neighboring province of Riau, a
Greenpeace Indonesia camp was burned down in what appears to be an act of arson
perpetrated by the corporate powers that profit from the deforestation Greenpeace
has raised protests against).
86. Oil Palm, supra note 83 at 159.
87. See, e.g., Unity and Diversity, supra note 28, at 89 (statement of Martono,
Minister of Transmigration) ("we have one native country, Indonesia; one language,
the Indonesian language. By way of Transmigration, we will try to realize what has
been pledged, to integrate all the ethnic groups into one nation, the Indonesia
nation. . .").
186
CAPITALIST EFFECTS
run oil palm companies were privatized. From the outset, a very
narrow set of economic interests have consistently benefited, and
the enduring power of these interests is also what has prevented
the democratization of State functions since 1998 from meaning-
fully reforming Indonesia's laws or how palm oil is produced.
This "enduring power" is largely the result of the degree to
which countries like Indonesia are dependent on foreign invest-
ment-whether it comes from the World Bank, the IMF, the Asian
Development Bank, private firms based in Malaysia, Thailand,
the Philippines or other South Asian countries, or multinational
corporations headquartered in Western nations. As with many
Latin American countries today, because it must attract the
investments of international economic institutions in order to sus-
tain itself-a position analogous to how individual Indonesian
provinces are in many ways now subordinated to the oil palm com-
panies they are supposed to regulate-the types of policies that
the Indonesian State is able to practically pursue are highly
restricted. If, for instance, President Habibibe would have pre-
ferred to carry out meaningful reforms of the oil palm sub-sector,
it is almost certain that the economy would have ground to a halt
due to capital flight if he had succeeded in doing so."
In this regard, it is relevant to note that the Reformasi Period
began in the midst of the 1997-1999 Asian Financial Crisis, one of
the consequences of which was to dramatically increase Indone-
sia's need for foreign investment, and thus expand international
economic institutions' power over the policies adopted by the Indo-
nesian State. This was because, as a recent review of the expan-
sion of oil palm plantations in Indonesia explains:
following the crisis of 1999, the central state no longer had
the fiscal, administrative or coercive capacity required to
support or extend the expansion of the estates. Rather, fol-
lowing the decentralisation reforms and in accordance with
the governance paradigm, the central state was to operate
more in a facilitation and coordination role, largely with-
drawing from direct involvement as a financier, facilitator
and guarantor of plantation operations involving the con-
version of lands subject to landowner claims."
88. For recent economic evaluations of the devastating effects of capital flight, see,
e.g., Joseph P. Joyce & Malhar Nabar, Sudden Stops, Banking Crises and Investment
Collapses in Emerging Markets, 90 J. DEV. ECON. 314, 314-322 (2009); Valerie Cerra,
Meenakshi Rishi & Sweta Saxena, Robbing the Riches: Capital Flight, Institutions
and Debt, 44 J. DEv. STU. 1190, 1190-1213 (2008).
89. John F. McCarthy & R.A. Cramb, Policy Narratives, Landholder Engagement,
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These economic institutions' have lent well-documented support
to some of the most destructive policies pursued by the New Order
regime (such as the expansion of Transmigration described
above). It is not unreasonable to suggest that this significant
expansion of foreign political influence in Indonesia immediately
prior to the passage of a series of policies that failed to realize (and
in some case directly undermined) demands for real democratic
reform is to some extent responsible for failure of those policies. In
fact, the results of a recent internal audit of the private sector arm
of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
appear to support conclusions that such a causal relationship may
be hampering reform efforts in Indonesia even today. The audit
reveals in detail how the World Bank is currently funding a num-
ber of multinational oil palm trading groups operating in Indone-
sia, despite having been made aware of the fact that the oil palm
plantations these groups have invested in explicitly and consist-
ently violate the World Bank's own Performance Standards for
loans, due to their negative environmental and social effects."
Further clarity regarding the types of policies international
investors find objectionable can be gained by considering how for-
eign oil palm companies operating in Indonesia reacted immedi-
ately after the overthrow of General Suharto. Following the
collapse of the New Order regime, indigenous populations' sup-
pressed opposition to oil palm plantations' expansion erupted in
the form of protests, worker-occupation of plantations, and other
tactics aimed at limiting the productive capacity of palm oil corpo-
rations.9 ' As Casson wrote succinctly at the time, these demands
for increased popular involvement in decision-making about
where oil palm plantations would be developed and how they
would be operated "resulted in the consequent withdrawal and
and Oil Palm Expansion on the Malaysian and Indonesian Frontiers, 175 THE
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 112, 116-117 (2009).
90. OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN, CAO AUDIT OF IFC CAO
COMPLIANCE 2-3 (2009), available at http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/ifi_igo/
ifcwilmar-cao.audit-report jun09_eng.pdf.
91. See, e.g., CASSON, supra note 59, at 13 ("Since May 1998, reformists have called
upon the national government to examine the domination of conglomerates in the
forestry sector and allow local communities to play a larger role in new economic
development. Unrest has also increased in and around estates because the 'reform
era' has provided an opportunity for communities to reclaim their land from
plantation companies. Communities have stepped up protests against further oil
palm expansion by burning estate offices, large machinery, processing plants and
plantations. Conflicts between estate workers and communities have also increased
and many have resulted in injury or death.").
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withholding of foreign investment." 2 Such a response is under-
standable given that the expansion of palm oil production under
General Suharto was often supported directly by the Indonesian
army." The fact that Habibie's administration did not respond to
indigenous communities' demands for democratization with mili-
tary force sent a clear signal to foreign investors that the Indone-
sian labor market would be much more undisciplined than it had
been under the New Order regime, thus potentially endangering
corporate interests. Casson further reported:
[M]any companies have said that, since the fall of Suharto,
they can no longer call on the armed forces to control the
security situation.... Unable to rely on Indonesian author-
ities for assistance some companies have been forced to
close down their operations, reduce their planting targets,
or withdraw their investments.9 4
Clearly, as long as barriers impeding the global movement of capi-
tal continue to be dismantled, capital flight will remain a potential
consequence of nearly any policy that is perceived as hindering
the expansion of private control over the means of production.
Evidently, this even includes a policy of not systematically sup-
92. Id. at 13.
93. For example, on December 7, 1975, nine days after Fretilin (the Revolutionary
Front for an Independent East Timor) declared independence from Indonesia, the
New Order sent in the Indonesia military-an invasion which, like the 1965 coup,
was supported both militarily and politically by Western governments. See, e.g., John
Pilger, Land of the Dead; Journey to East Timor, THE NATION, Apr. 25, 1994, at 550-
552; see also Arnold Kohen, The Cruel Case of Indonesia, THE NATION, Nov. 26, 1977,
at 553-556. This annexation of East Timor had a staggering human cost, with
estimates placing the death toll at roughly 30% of the population. See, e.g., John
Pilger, A Voice That Shames Those Silent on Timor, NEW STATESMAN & SOCIETY, Apr.
8, 1994, at 16. In addition, "by the end of 1979, several hundred thousand Timorses
had been rounded up and forced into dozens of strategic encampments, called
pemukiman or settlements by the Indonesians but de[slpised by the Timorese as
concentration camps. Security regulations are strict; inhabitants are prohibited from
moving in and out without special permission, even to grow food, and land use is
restricted to areas very close to camp boundaries." Budiardjo, supra note 18, at 115.
Nevertheless, the suppression of the popular demands for democratic self-governance
created a bonanza for the relevant economic interests. See, e.g., John Pilger, A Voice
That Shames Those Silent on Timor, NEW STATESMAN & SOCIETY, Apr. 8, 1994, at 16.
("Within two months of the Dili massacre ... the Australian government oversaw the
awarding of 11 contracts [to exploit Timorese oil] under the Timor Gap treaty. Signed
in 1989 by [Australian Foreign Minister Gareth] Evans and his Indonesian
counterpart, Ali Alatas, flying over the mass graves of East Timor and toasting each
other in champagne, the treaty allows Australians and other foreign companies to
exploit the gas and oil reserves off East Timor which, says Evans, could bring in
'zillions' of dollars.").
94. CASSON, supra note 59, at 13-14.
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pressing popular political demands with state violence. Espe-
cially, as long as there are states like Mexico-which most
recently reaffirmed its willingness to exert military force to defend
the expansion of oil palm plantations against the protests of its
poorest and most disenfranchised citizens in January of 2010" -
corporate palm oil enterprises will see no reason to do business in
nations whose governments do not facilitate and protect their
rapacious practices.
This examination of the influence foreign capital has upon
Indonesian political processes helps explain why the manner in
which palm oil is produced has not been significantly changed
during the Reformasi Period in any of the respects discussed
above. Thus, for example, even if the xenophobia of men like
Murdani and Martono was completely eradicated from political
decision-making in Indonesia, so long as the threat of capital
flight persists, the customary rights of indigenous populations
would likely never be protected and upheld by the state. The fact
that, in the example just mentioned, the Indonesian State enacted
a policy that was perceived to represent a disincentive for the
investment of foreign capital-the State's decision to not use the
military to suppress labor protests-should not suggest that Indo-
nesia frequently or seriously risks provoking significant capital
flight. On the contrary, Indonesia's generally unwavering adher-
ence to the dictates of international economic institutions can be
discerned by simply examining the rate at which land has been
converted for oil palm plantations during the last 12 years.
Although land conversion initially fell after the New Order
regime was overthrown,96 oil palm investors quickly regained con-
fidence as they "established new political connections so that rates
of planting could be restored."97 The foregoing analysis has
explored a few of the consequences of these "new political connec-
tions" that facilitated such a rebound in the growth of oil palm
plantations (e.g., the deregulation of palm oil production on both
the national and provincial level, and the consistent failure of the
95. Mixico: Violent Evictions in Chiapas for Establishing Oil Palm Monocultures,
WORLD RAINFOREST MOVEMENT BULLETIN No. 151 (World Rainforest Movement,
Montevideo, Uru.), Feb. 2010, at 1, available at http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/151/
Mexico.html.
96. ERIC WAKKER, GREASY PALMS: THE SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF LARGE-
SCALE OIL PALM PLANTATION DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 30 (Friends of the
Earth, 2005), available at http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/greasy-palms
impacts.pdf.
97. COLCHESTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 23.
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few attempts that have been made during the Reformasi Period to
implement legislation democratizing state functions). As a result,
in 2006, provincial governments' own land-use plans identified 20
million hectares of forestland as suitable for conversion into oil
palm plantations"-proposals that will likely continue to be put
into practice as they were between 2006 and 2008, during which
time the amount of land encompassed by oil palm plantations
grew from 6 million hectares to 7.3 million hectares." There can
be little doubt that the "political connections" foreign investors
have been able to establish over the last decade lie behind this
trend. These connections also explain why every Indonesian
Administration since the fall of Suharto, who was swept into
power following a wave of popular desire for democratic reforms,
have nevertheless continued to make investing in Indonesian
palm oil production much more attractive to private entities by
reducing the public's ability to play a role in deciding how this
investment should take place and increasing palm oil companies'
ability to legally devastate Indonesia's environment in their pur-
suit of profit.
IV. CONCLUSION
None of the foregoing should suggest, however, that the fall of
the New Order regime has entirely failed to create substantial
possibilities for actual democratic reforms. Indeed, the fact that
General Suharto was able to be driven from power reflects the fact
that even exceedingly authoritarian and oppressive institutions
will respond to sufficient amounts of public pressure. Despite the
attacks it has suffered, there is still a civil society in Indonesia
capable of acting in defense of social interests-nevermind the
economic incentive to oppose political reform. The fact that some
reforms were realized in 1998 and 1999 is due almost entirely to
the enduring efforts of popular labor movements, student protests
and demonstrations, and grassroots international solidarity cam-
paigns such as the East Timor Action Network. 00 Indeed, in 2009,
98. Id. at 25.
99. SERGE MARTI, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, Losing Ground: The human rights
impacts of oil palm plantation expansion in Indonesia 19 (2008).
100. For a discussion of student dissent, see Seth Mydans, Suharto, Besieged, Steps
Down After 32-Year Rule In Indonesia, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1998, at Al; see also
GEORGE J. ADITJONDRO, IN THE SHADOW OF MOUNT RAMELAU: THE IMPACT OF THE
OCCUPATION OF EAST TIMOR 83 (1994). For reports of labor unrest, see Jeremy
Seabrook, Indonesian Workers Risk Freedom for Rights, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
WKLY., Oct. 23, 1994, at A7; see also John Pilger, The Rsing of Indonesia, NEW
1912011]1
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similar popular organizations succeeded in re-electing Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia's first President to be elected to
the office by the general population,10 to a second five-year term.
This affirmation of Yudhoyono's popular support has given him a
mandate to continue to play a prominent role in pressuring
nations to confront the effects that deforestation in their countries
has on climate change, as he did so visibly during his first term.102
Nevertheless, this paper should illustrate how nominal legal
or procedural reforms, if they do not examine and address the
underlying economic forces which drive Indonesia's democrati-
cally elected Parliament to act in ways that are explicitly anti-
STATESMAN & Soc'y, June 16, 1995, at 14-15 ("Suharto's recent, disastrous trip to
Germany has left him virtually friendless in Europe, with of course the exception of
Britain. Governments do business with him, but they don't want his presence, a
remarkable situation for the head of the Non-Aligned Movement [at the U.N.]. In
Weimar, the city council voted to call off his visit; in Hanover, the Lord Mayor
attacked him in a speech given in his presence; in Dresden, angry crowds virtually
held him hostage, encircling his bus and plastering it with 'Free East Timor! Suharto
Murderer!' signs. During this siege, Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas became
apoplectic and entertained the crowd with obscene gestures. A photograph of Alatas
giving the finger, reproduced on the next page, says much about the regime's
deepening frustration and humiliation. In the past, Alatas has cultivated an image of
urbanity and reasonableness, even turning up at the World Conference on Human
Rights at Vienna in 1993 with his very own 'collected speeches on human rights' in a
glossy folder. Then, no delegate raised the question of his regime's well-documented
genocide in East Timor. Today, he would not get away with it.").
101. There were three other Presidents who held the office following the overthrow
of General Suharto prior to Yudhoyono's election (B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid
and Sukarno's daughter, Dyah Permata Megawati). Habibie's Presidency was
possible only because he was Suharto's vice-president before Suharto was forced from
power, and the two President's that followed Habibie were elected to their position by
the national legislature, not a popular election. See generally, Presidents,
INDAHNEsIA.CoM (last revised Dec. 1, 2009) http://indahnesia.com/indonesial
PRESUH/suharto.php (providing background on the history of Indonesian
presidential actors, their history, and initiatives).
102. For example, on September 24, 2007, Yudhoyono led a summit of eight
countries (Brazil, Cameroon, Congo, Costa Rica, Gabon, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Papua New Guinea-nations that, collectively, are home to approximately 80% of the
earth's tropical rainforests) in New York City, a conference that attempted to raise
concerns about global warming. And from December 3rd to the 15th of 2007,
Indonesia, under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) hosted the 13th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-13) in Bali.
Furthermore, Yudhoyono's administration supported the U.N.'s passage of the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, which bears directly on oil
palm production in Indonesia. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept.13, 2007) ("Indigenous peoples have
the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional
knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their
sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds,
medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures,
designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts.").
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democratic, can do very little to alter the domination and subordi-
nation of the least powerful social classes or slow the continued
destruction of the environment. The policies that have sanctioned
the devastating effects of palm oil production on indigenous popu-
lations and the environment cannot be explained simply with
appeals to greed, malice, misanthropy or xenophobic prejudice.
Rather, the state-supported capitalist system which has developed
in Indonesia since the 1960s-and not simply the ill will of a few
individual actors-must be recognized and examined as the prin-
cipal driver that has created the conditions under which attacks
on civil society and the natural environment are permitted and
supported by the State.
This is highly relevant to the work that is currently being
done in Latin America. For example, in 2006, RECOMA organ-
ized mobilizations against monoculture tree-plantations in Brazil
at the Federal University"o', Argentina in the Province of Entre
Rios and Misioneso^ and Uruguay at the City Hall Esplanade'.
Such popular political action is no doubt a necessary precondition
to any effective resistance against the violent methods of expropri-
ation employed in the expansion of palm oil plantations. Never-
theless, what the Indonesian experience illustrates is that this
expansion cannot be conceived of as simply the consequence of
malevolent palm oil companies, nor as an inevitable characteristic
of palm oil production.
Without first analyzing and critiquing the structure and oper-
ation of this system, it is unlikely that any political reforms can be
developed that will substantively address the very real problems
of economic inequality and environmental degradation in Latin
American countries; instead, they will likely fail in a manner simi-
lar to that exhibited in Indonesia. A critique of state-capitalist
power consequently constitutes a preliminary task that can
greatly aid attempts at cultivating the cultural conditions that
can support institutional systems which serve human, and not
merely capitalist, needs.
103. International Day against Monoculture Tree Plantations, WORLD RAINFOREST
MOVEMENT (Sept. 21, 2006), http://www.wrm.org.uy/plantations/RECOMA/
International.html.
104. Id.
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